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Abstract
In this paper I assess the adequacy of no-conspiracy conditions employed in the
usual derivations of the Bell inequality in the context of EPR correlations. First,
I look at the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and
claim that common cause explanations of these cannot be ruled out. I argue that
an appropriate common cause explanation requires that no-conspiracy conditions are
re-interpreted as mere common cause-measurement independence conditions. In the
right circumstances then, violations of measurement independence need not entail any
kind of conspiracy (nor backwards in time causation). To the contrary, if measurement
operations in the EPR context are taken to be causally relevant in a specific way to
the experiment outcomes, their explicit causal role provides the grounds for a common
cause explanation of the corresponding correlations.
1 Introduction
This paper aims to provide an analysis of some our most robust intuitions about cau-
sation, with the ultimate purpose of testing them in the context of quantum mechanics.
Philosophers wanting to understand causation need to face, for instance, the adequacy of
the diverse methods of causal inference available. Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common
Cause (RPCC) is one such method, and it is precisely in the quantum mechanical context
that RPCC faces one of its most significant threats. I shall not discuss the specific prob-
lems related to the philosophical status of RPCC —these are diverse and interesting in
themselves even if quantum mechanics is not brought into the picture. RPCC will simply
be assumed to hold, for the sake of the argument, and the causal picture that it purports
tested in the quantum context.
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The received view, though, takes it that (Reichenbachian) common cause accounts of
EPR correlations are to be ruled out (Butterfield, 1989, 2007; Cartwright, 1987; Graßhoff et al.,
2005; van Fraassen, 1982). The standard argument views causes as hidden variables onto
which several constraints are set. These constraints are intended to reflect standard re-
quirements typical of any physical system, including temporal order of causal relations
and considerations about locality. As a result, some Bell-type inequality is derived. The
strength of such arguments relies, as it stands, on the plausibility of the conditions imposed
on the common causes.
No-conspiracy is one such condition present in the usual derivations of the Bell inequal-
ities. The motivation behind it is that the postulated common causes be independent of
the measurement settings. Violations of such independence are standardly interpreted as
to entail certain strange ‘conspiratorial behaviour’, unless super-determinism or backwards
in time causation is brought into the picture (Berkovitz, 2002; Price, 1994; Szabo´, 2000,
2008).
I shall challenge this standard reading of no-conspiracy-type conditions. I will do this in
two steps. I will first look at the very formal structure of such conditions, while remaining
neutral as to whether their violation entail any kind of conspiracy. I will then look at
the EPR correlations from a purely phenomenological point of view and assess the role
of measurement in the EPR experiment itself. This will suggest a re-interpretation of no-
conspiracy-type conditions, under which violations of these can be accommodated with no
conspiratorial implications attached to them, nor backwards in time causation. I claim
that this new view also provides the grounds for a potential common cause model of EPR
correlations. Although the model is not to be developed in full here, I shall sketch what
its main features could be and discuss its potential consequences as regards non-locality.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary background
on the EPR experiment and Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause respectively.
In Section 3 the formal structure of the problem is stated and the idea of no-conspiracy
introduced. Section 4 looks at the EPR experiment again but this time from a purely
phenomenological point of view, and examines the role of measurement in it. This analysis
will eventually identify the main features of a potential common cause model of EPR,
which is developed (although only partially) in Section 5. The implications of this partial
model as regards locality are discussed in Section 6, together with some open questions for
further investigation.
2 EPR correlations and Common Causes
Consider the Bohm version of the EPR experiment. Two entangled electrons are emitted
from a source in opposite directions. The spin component of each of the electrons can be
later detected (measured) in three different directions θi (i = 1, 2, 3) after having passed
through an inhomogeneous magnetic field. It is assumed that the state of the entangled
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electron pair at the source is the spin singlet state:
Ψs =
1√
2
(ψ+L ⊗ ψ−R − ψ−L ⊗ ψ+R),
where ψ+L (ψ
+
R) denotes the up eigenvector of the spin component of the particle in the
left (right) wing of the experiment along a given direction. Similarly for ψ−L (ψ
−
R) and the
down eigenvector of the spin component of the corresponding particle.
Let us write Li and Rj for the different measurement settings in each wing of the
experiment. Also, we shall denote by a and b the value of the spin variable of each electron
in a given measurement direction which, for the singlet state, can be either ‘spin-up’ (+)
or ‘spin-down’ (−), with probability 1
2
. Measurement outcome events on each particle
along each of the three different measurement directions will be written as Lai and R
b
j , with
a, b = +,− and i, j = 1, 2, 3.
It is assumed that both measurements and outcome events at each wing of the ex-
periment, Lai and R
b
j , are space-like separated. Quantum mechanical probabilities for the
possible outcomes of the experiment are given by the trace Tr(Wˆ Aˆ), where Wˆ is the den-
sity operator corresponding to the singlet state Ψs and Aˆ is the projector associated to a
particular property of the system —say, for instance, ‘spin-up’ along direction i.
Quantum mechanics predicts correlations between the outcomes measured in the three
possible directions in both wings. We would like to know whether these correlations are
the result of underlying causal processes. At this point already, the idea of common cause
seems rather appealing. For the space-like separation of the outcomes at each wing of the
experiment seems to rule out, at least in principle, direct causal interactions between these.
And this is in fact the typical situation common cause explanations are suitable for.
The principle of the common cause was first introduced by Reichenbach (1956). It
states, in short, that there are no correlations without causal explanation (either in terms
of direct causal interactions or by means of a common cause).
The idea of correlation is defined within the framework of classical Kolmogorovian
probability spaces as:1
Definition 1 Let (S, p) be a classical probability measure space with Boolean algebra S
representing the set of random events and with the probability measure p defined on S. If
A, B ∈ S are such that
Corrp(A,B) = p(A ∧B)− p(A) · p(B) > 0, (1)
then the event types A and B are said to be (positively) correlated.
1This definition is of positive correlation. A completely symmetrical definition may be given for nega-
tive correlations. Distinguishing between positive and negative correlations will not be important for the
argument here. Thus, if not stated otherwise, positive correlations will be assumed throughout the paper.
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The principle of the common cause can then be formalised, following Reichenbach’s
own ideas, as follows:
Definition 2 (RPCC) For any two (positively) correlated event types A and B (Corrp(A,B) >
0), if A is not a cause of B and neither B is a cause of A, there exists a common cause C
of A and B such that the following independent conditions hold:
p(A ∧B|C) = p(A|C) · p(B|C) (2)
p(A ∧B|¬C) = p(A|¬C) · p(B|¬C) (3)
p(A|C) > p(A|¬C) (4)
p(B|C) > p(B|¬C) (5)
where p(A|B) = p(A ∧ B)/p(B) denotes the probability of A conditional on B and it is
assumed that none of the probabilities p(X) (X = A,B,C,¬C) is equal to zero.
The philosophical status of RPCC is not completely settled. There is no need to address
here the various philosophical problems that RPCC faces, though, and I shall assume in
what follows that the principle, as stated above, holds.2 I shall refer to common causes
postulated by Definition 2 irrespectively as Reichenbachian common causes, screening-off
common causes or simply common causes. Endorsing RPCC may be motivated by at
least two reasons. First, note that for Reichenbach the role of the principle is mainly
explanatory (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 159). The explanatory power of screening-off common
causes may thus be taken as a good methodological reason to support the adequacy of
RPCC for the inference of causal relations from probabilistic facts, even if it can be patently
shown not to hold as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for common causes.
Second, recent results show that, at least formally, it is always possible to provide
a Reichenbachian common cause for any given correlation. These results build on the
intuition that any probability space S containing a set of correlations and which does not
include (Reichenbachian) common causes of these, may be extended in such a way that
the new probability space S ′ does include (Reichenbachian) common causes for each of
the original correlations. This is formalised in so-called extendability and common cause
completability theorems (Hofer-Szabo´ et al., 1999, 2000).
Common cause completability thus constitutes a very powerful tool if we are to provide
common cause explanations of generic correlations. The whole program faces however its
own problems, especially when it comes to the physical interpretation of either the enlarged
probability space S ′ or the new common causes contained in it.3 In particular, it seems
a fair criticism to the program to claim that common cause completability is merely a
formal device, which is likely to lack physical meaning in many (perhaps too many) cases.
2See Sua´rez (2007) and San Pedro & Sua´rez (2009) for a detailed assessment of the status of RPCC.
3I point the reader to San Pedro & Sua´rez (2009) for a recent assessment the significance of common
cause completability, possible criticisms to it and the strategies to avoid these.
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To be more precise, what Hofer-Szabo´ et al. show is that, for any given correlation, there
exist formal objects (events on the algebra) which conform to Definition 2. These we
call (Reichenbachian) common causes, as pointed out, even if they may well lack physical
(causal) interpretation. Thus, what common cause completability provides, rather than a
proof that there exist common causes (with causal/physical meaning this time) for any
correlation, is a proof that these cannot be ruled out. All in all, and despite the limitations
of the formal results by Hofer-Szabo´ et al., the idea of common cause completability encodes
a bunch of good intuitions as to what we should require or expect when looking for common
cause explanations. Common cause completability can thus be taken as a good heuristic
or methodological tool when aiming at explaining correlations in terms of common causes.
It is with this remarks in mind that common cause completability is invoked here.
There is a further important remark as regards common cause completability. It has to
do with the distinction between so-called individual-common causes and common-common
causes. We call individual-common causes those events satisfying (2)-(5) for a single (indi-
vidual) correlation only. Common-common causes, on the other hand, will satisfy (2)-(5)
for a set of two or more correlations. This is an important distinction since, while individ-
ual-common cause completability holds in general for every classical probability space S,
this is not the case for common-common causes. In other words, while common cause com-
pletability guarantees that individual-common causes exist (at least formally) for any given
correlation, this is not true in general for common-common causes (Hofer-Szabo´ et al.,
2002). In what follows and if not stated otherwise, when common cause is written it will
mean individual-common cause.
3 Structure of the problem
We now seem to be in a position to attempt at an answer to the question as to whether
an explanation of the EPR correlations can be given in terms of common causes. In order
to proceed it is convenient to interpret quantum probabilities, i.e trace-like quantities
Tr(Wˆ Aˆ), as classical conditional probabilities —conditional on measurement operations,
that is.4 Thus the ‘quantum probability’ that the particle in the left wing of the experiment,
for instance, is measured with spin-up will be given by p(L+i |Li).
Now if we recall common cause completability, the answer to our question seems, at least
in principle, a positive one. The issue is not so simple, though. For we cannot overlook the
fact that if our postulated common causes are to be physically sensible at all, they will need
to fulfil certain requirements —besides those in their definition, i.e. equations (2)-(5). The
4This is indeed standard and, as pointed out by (Szabo´, 2000, p. 4), taking quantum probabilities as
classical conditional probabilities is crucial for the whole issue regarding Reichenbachian common cause
explanations of EPR correlations to be meaningful. As an alternative we would need to redefine RPCC to
fit the non-classical probabilistic framework of quantum mechanics. This option is explored for instance
in Henson (2005).
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problem becomes thus more complex since we first need to identify and characterise these
extra (physically sensible) requirements Reichenbachian common causes must conform to.
Such conditions typically include those intended to capture in some sense or another
the idea of physical locality —so as to avoid conflict with special relativity.5 But requiring
constraints of this type basically leads to the Bell inequalities, and the usual move is
then to give up the idea of Reichenbachian common cause. It is not completely clear
however whether this needs to be the case. Indeed we may want to insist in providing a
Reichenbachian common cause explanation of the correlations while avoiding the charge
of Bell’s theorem. The strategy would then be to define a set of conditions that, along
with the idea of Reichenbachian common cause, provides a satisfactory explanation of the
correlations without being committed to the Bell inequalities. Ideally we would like to
make sure that such restrictions do not entail the idea of common-common cause either.
For, as I have pointed out it is not likely that common-common cause explanations exist
for any set of correlations in general.
One of the most remarkable attempts to provide a common cause model for EPR
following this strategy is Szabo´ (2000). Szabo´’s model is explicitly construed by recursively
applying the idea of common cause completability. It turns out however that the model
features unwanted dependencies between certain combinations of the postulated common
causes and the measurement setting events. These dependencies are usually interpreted as
conspiratorial.
Avoiding such conspiratorial features is indeed the role of so-called no-conspiracy con-
ditions which are also standard in the derivations of the Bell inequalities. Roughly, no-
conspiracy conditions require statistical independence between the common cause C and
the measurement settings:
p(Li ∧C) = p(Li) · p(C), (6)
p(Rj ∧C) = p(Rj) · p(C). (7)
The intuition, clearly, is that the postulated common causes must not have an influence,
or be otherwise influenced, by the choices of measurement settings. In the usual interpreta-
tion, the existence of such influences —i.e. violations of the equations (6) and (7)— would
be conspiratorial in the sense that the taking place of the common cause would some-
how ‘force’ or determine to some extent the presumably free independent decisions of the
experimenter about measurement.
Equations (6) and (7) may be regarded as ‘simple’ no-conspiracy conditions, in that
they involve only one common cause event at a time. More complex conditions may involve
combinations (both conjunctions and disjunctions) of the different postulated individual-
common causes, e.g. p(Li ∧ Cabij ∧ Ca
′b′
i′j′ ) —these complex no-conspiracy conditions are
5What it is exactly meant by ‘physical locality’ and whether such concept may be appropriately captured
in terms of probabilistic relations, though, is far from settled. I shall not discuss these issues in detail here
and just point the reader to Butterfield (2007); Fine (1981, 1986); Maudlin (1994); Wessels (1985) or Sua´rez
(2000) for further reference.
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actually what Szabo´ (2000)’s model fails to satisfy. We need not discuss the later case
here. For I will be arguing that violations of the ‘simple’ case, i.e. of equations (6) and (7),
are consistent with a plausible common cause explanation of EPR correlations. And, of
course, violations of the ‘simple’ no-conspiracy conditions also entail violations of the more
complex relations.
The significance of no-conspiracy assumptions relies heavily on another underlying
implicit assumption. This is the assumption that the postulated common causes take
place before the apparatus are set for measurement, and therefore also before (always in
the rest-frame of the laboratory) measurement is performed. And it is only by assuming
this specific time-order framework that one can make sense of the standard interpretation
involving claims about world conspiracies and free will (or the lack of it).6 This is a crucial
assumption but in my view it is not completely warranted. Indeed, I shall challenge it
and suggest that violations of (6) and (7) do not necessarily entail that there being world
conspiracies. In order to keep neutral as regards the possible conspiratorial implications of
the violation of expressions (6) and (7), I shall refer to them as measurement independence
conditions.
4 EPR from a phenomenological point of view
I would now like to tackle the issue from a different point of view. More specifically, I shall
not look at the EPR correlations as ‘quantum correlations’ —i.e. as correlations defined
between conditional probabilities, as suggested in Szabo´ (2000)—, and then postulate the
corresponding individual-common causes. Instead, I shall look at the EPR correlations
from a completely classical perspective first, where entirely classical common causes can
be postulated for them. Only later I shall provide these common causes with an appropriate
quantum mechanical interpretation.
Suppose then we are provided with two lab record notebooks, each containing the
results of the corresponding experiments at each wing of the EPR-Bohm set-up. We are to
look for correlation patterns among our raw phenomenological data. The data analysis is
at a completely classical level, and we can therefore set aside any considerations related to
quantum mechanics at this point. (The data, in other words, is to be treated classically,
regardless of its quantum origin.) Suppose for the sake of the argument that, faced with
the correlated data, we can rule out with certainty direct causal connections between the
correlated variables. This points then to the possibility of explaining the correlations in
terms of common causes. In fact, since the correlations are defined over a completely
classical framework, i.e. among events that belong to a Boolean algebra, we may want to
6In fact, I think this is why discussions about free will and backwards in time causation are so much
entangled. For those defending backwards causation still assume (temporal) priority of common causes in
relation to measurement operations. (Only, in those cases, time order and causal order are not assumed to
coincide.) See, for instance, Berkovitz (2002) or Price (1994).
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take advantage of common cause completability and set for a common cause explanation.7
What would the structure of such classically postulated common causes be?
The first thing to note is that the postulated common causes are Reichenbachian in-
dividual-common causes. (This is so by construction). That is to say, they are common
causes which screen-off one, and only one, of the correlations. Consequently, they will have
a label which identifies the specific correlation, i.e. a, b = +,−. On the other hand, each
correlation found among our record notebooks data sets refers explicitly to a particular
‘joint experiment’, which corresponds to the specific measurement operations carried out
on both wings of the EPR-Bohm set-up. The postulated common cause will the be labelled
accordingly as well, i.e. i, j = 1, 2, 3. Let us denote such an event as Cabij .
8 We will have
then:
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Cabij ) = p(Lai |Cabij ) · p(Rbj|Cabij ), (8)
p(Lai ∧Rbj|¬Cabij ) = p(Lai |¬Cabij ) · p(Rbj |¬Cabij ), (9)
p(Lai |Cabij ) > p(Lai |¬Cabij ), (10)
p(Rbj |Cabij ) > p(Rbj |¬Cabij ). (11)
The fact that both the correlations and thus the postulated common causes refer to
specific ‘joint experiments’ —which are defined, as pointed out, by specifying the actual
measurement operations performed on both wings of the EPR-Bohm set-up— may be
interpreted as to suggest that the Cabij events have a causal component due to both the
EPR measurement operations. That is, the postulated common causes can be thought as
to contain or include somehow information about the measurement operations. In other
words, measurement operations are causally relevant to the common causes in this picture.
This is indeed a remarkable feature of the postulated common causes, although far from
uncontroversial.9
Note however that measurement operations need not be taken as the only relevant
causal factors of the common causes. In particular, there seem to be good intuitive grounds
to say that the postulated common cause events will include some characteristic feature of
the system at hand. It is very often assumed that the spin-singlet state itself —or perhaps
7The actual process of finding screening-off events (potential common causes) may consist in recursively
applying common cause completability, as in Szabo´ (2000). We should keep in mind however the various
limitations of this approach. (See my remarks in Section 2 for details).
8I am following here basically the same notation to that in the rest of the paper. Only I shall denote
the common cause of the classical correlations with a serif font Cabij instead of the usual italic C
ab
ij used in
standard treatments of the problem in order to stress their exclusively classical origin.
9In the context of EPR correlations it is indeed standard to assume measurement operations not to
be causally relevant for common causes —this is in fact why ‘no-conspiracy’-type conditions are required.
Note moreover that the expression ‘measurement operations’ here include not only the experimenter’s act
of setting-up the apparatus but also the actual interaction between the particle and the apparatus when
measurement is preformed.
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some factor closely related to it— is causally relevant to the EPR outcomes.10 Finally, the
postulated common causes will not necessarily be deterministic, i.e. their occurrence will
not necessarily entail that the corresponding outcomes will occur with certainty.
5 A (partial) common cause model for EPR correlations
The above can be expressed formally, in terms of algebra events and probabilistic relations.
These shall provide the grounds for a potential common cause model of EPR. I shall not
develop such a model in full here but only sketch its most salient features and discuss their
consequences. In this sense, what follows is to be seen as a partial or incomplete common
cause model of EPR. I shall nevertheless refer to it as ‘model’ throughout.
5.1 Individual -common causes and outcome independence
Recall first that common causes were each postulated to screen-off a single correlation
—they are what I called individual-common causes. I expressed that by means of the
screening-off conditions (8)-(9).
Now the causal role of measurement can be explicitly accounted for if we think of the
postulated individual-common causes Cabij as events of the form
C
ab
ij ⊂ Li ∧Rj ∧ Λ, (12)
where Li and Rj are the specific measurement operations and Λ is a futher causal factor.
11
Typically, Λ will most probably be associated to the singlet state Ψs itself, and perhaps to
some other relevant causal factors prior to the preparation of the entangled system.12 In
some sense Λ seems much more deeply related to the ‘inner’ quantum mechanical structure
of the system than the postulated common causes Cabij . (This observation is also supported
by the fact that the Cabij have been postulated in a purely classical context). Indeed, the
postulated common causes Cabij should not be thought of as hidden variables as such. For
they are not aimed at completing in any sense the quantum description of the system.
We may assume furthermore that the causal factor Λ is common to several (or even to
all) correlations in the EPR experiment. It is important to note however that Λ, in contrast
to the Cabij , will not in general screen-off the correlations. We shall explicitly require this
in order to avoid problems concerning common-common causes. That such problems may
10This is indeed commonplace (Cartwright, 1987; Cartwright & Jones, 1991; Chang & Cartwright, 1993;
Healey, 1992; Price, 1994; Sua´rez, 2007; van Fraassen, 1982).
11Why Cabij is defined as a subset of the conjunction Li ∧ Rj ∧ Λ, and not as identical to it, will become
clear in a moment.
12This characterisation of Λ reminds somehow to the kind of events Cartwright considers the right common
cause events for EPR. That the similarity is quite so it will become clear in a moment, since I will be requiring
(or at least allowing) that the Λ be non-screening-off events, just like in Cartwright’s common cause account
of EPR (Cartwright, 1987; Cartwright & Jones, 1991; Chang & Cartwright, 1993).
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arise is clear, since if Λ is a screening-off causal factor common to all the possible outcomes
of the experiment, it surely is a common-common cause of all the outcome correlations.
And as pointed out a common-common cause model cannot in general be guaranteed
to exist. Moreover, in the EPR context, assuming common-common causes leads quite
straightforwardly to the Bell inequalities.
Similar reasons take us to require as well that the conjunction of Λ with the measure-
ment operation events, i.e. Li∧Rj∧Λ, be non-screening-off events. In particular, Li∧Rj∧Λ
is assumed to be a causal factor common to all the correlations that involve these particular
measurement settings.
This suggests that the event Li∧Rj∧Λ contains all the postulated common cause events
C
ab
ij corresponding to the correlations displayed for these specific measurement settings.
That is:
Li ∧Rj ∧ Λ ⊇ C++ij ∨ C+−ij ∨ C−+ij ∨ C−−ij . (13)
One may however think that the above would entail that the Cabij be common-common
causes. In order to avoid that and guarantee that Cabij be individual-common causes, we
shall require that they be mutually exclusive, i.e.
C
ab
ij ∧ Ca
′b′
ij = ∅, (14)
where a, b, a′, b′ = +,− and ab 6= a′b′.
A remarkable feature of the resulting event structure is that our postulated common
causes Cabij satisfy a familiar condition very closely related to the derivation of the Bell
inequalities, namely outcome independence (OI):
p(Lai ∧Rbj |Li ∧Rj ∧ Cabij ) = p(Lai |Li ∧Rj ∧ Cabij ) · p(Rbj|Li ∧Rj ∧ Cabij ), (15)
This is indeed what expressions (8) and (9) encapsulate.13 But note as well that, on the
other hand, the event Λ (and also Li ∧Rj ∧ Λ) will not in general satisfy such constraint.
In particular, both Λ and Li ∧ Rj ∧ Λ will in general violate outcome independence due
to the requirement that they do not screen-off the correlations —recall this was explicitly
required in order to avoid the usual problems regarding common-common causes. Thus a
model built on the premisses above would be able to accommodate the usual interpretation
of the violations of the Bell inequalities, via violations of outcome independence, when Λ
is taken as the hidden variable.14
13Elementary calculation shows that if (12) holds, expression (8) entails equation (15) above.
14This view hinges on the claim that, because of the spherical symmetry of the spin-singlet state, quantum
mechanics violates outcome independence, while it is compatible with parameter independence.
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5.2 Common cause measurement dependence is not conspiracy
A second remarkable feature of a model as the outlined above is that, because of the depen-
dence of the common causes on measurement, the Cabij violate measurement independence.
That is:
p(Cabij ∧ Li) 6= p(Cabij ) · p(Li), (16)
p(Cabij ∧Rj) 6= p(Cabij ) · p(Rj). (17)
Recall that measurement independence was a condition explicitly required in the stan-
dard view —usually under the name of no-conspiracy— on the grounds that its viola-
tion would amount to some sort of ‘universal conspiracy’. The question then seems quite
straightforward: in the light of expressions (16) and (17), does the above constitute a ‘con-
spiratorial’ model? Alternatively, is measurement independence a reasonable assumption
for common causes of EPR correlations? The answer to both these questions, I think, is
negative.
The charge of conspiracy may be avoided in different ways. Appealing to backwards in
time causation is one of them, which I shall discuss only briefly in the next section.
Another possibility, more novel and interesting in my opinion, opens up if we look closely
at the role of measurement in the experiment. In fact, one of the things I pointed out when
discussing the significance of measurement independence was that it seemed appropriate
only if one assumed that the common causes take place prior to the measurement apparatus
is set up (and therefore before measurement has been performed). It is only in those cases
that probabilistic dependencies between the common causes and measurement settings,
i.e. violations of measurement independence, may be sensibly interpreted as some sort of
‘world conspiracy’. However, there is nothing in the notion of common cause, nor in the
very structure of the EPR experiment, that forces us to endorse the fact that the common
cause must take place prior to measurement.
In fact, relations (2)-(5) on page 4 —taken as a definition of (Reichenbachian) common
cause— do not include spatio-temporal information of any sort. This is mainly due to the
fact that they involve event types, which are not defined in space time. It is only in virtue
of them being collections of token events that we can refer to them spatio-temporally.
And it is only under this view that common cause (type) events in expressions (2)-(5) can
be said to be located in the causal past of the correlated (type) events —meaning that
the corresponding token events follow the correct temporal sequence. In the particular
case of the EPR experiment, we want to require that the postulated common causes and
the corresponding outcome events be time-like (ensuring hence temporal priority of the
common causes). But, once more, this needs not entail that such common causes be
located prior to measurement operations.
So, we may perfectly allow instead for the common causes to take place after measure-
ment operations have been performed —and therefore after the measurement devices have
11
(a)
C
ab
ij
Li
Lai
Rbj
Li
Rbj
Lai
Λ Λ
RjRj
C
ab
ij
(b)
Figure 1: Measurement dependent no-conspiratorial common causes may be thought of
either (a) as non-localised events spreading over some region of space-time, or (b) as well
localised common cause events reaching space-like separated regions.
been set-up as well.15 In such a case, requiring measurement independence conditions to
hold does not seem particularly appealing and, more importantly, there is nothing conspir-
atorial about them being violated. This is indeed the possibility the model above exploits.
To illustrate how such measurement dependent no-conspiratorial common causes may look
like two possibile conceptions are shown in Figure 1. Common causes may be thought of as
non-localised events which spread over some region of space-time (Figure 1(a)). Or prehaps
as well localised common cause events whose causal influences reach however space-like sep-
arated regions (Figure 1(b)). There is no need to discuss the details, virtues and possible
problems of each of the two conceptions above. They are provided just as exemplifications
for measurement dependent no-conspiratorial common causes and, of course, they need not
be the only possibilities to conceive these.
A possible objection to the view that common causes take place after measurement
would be to note that since in this picture the notions ‘before’ and ‘after’ are frame depen-
dent, the violation of measurement independence will be interpretable as no-conspiratorial
in some frames of reference only, i.e. those in which the common cause events do in fact
take place ‘after’ measurement. In other frames of reference, the common cause events will
take place ‘before’ measurement and still violate measurement independence, which would
suggest, again, some kind of conspiratorial behaviour.
I see different possible responses to the objection above. One may argue in the first
15The idea of common causes taking place after measurement can also be found in Martel (2008).
However, Martel’s proposal does not have the same aims and scope than mine here. In particular, Martel
discusses specific issues as regards the philosophical status of the so-called causal Markov condition —
a generalisation of RPCC—, and does not pay attenton to the consequences of the actual violation of
measurement independence, when it comes to locality, for instance.
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place that, while it is true that the notions ‘before’ and ‘after’ are frame dependent, they
still have some significance, which one may take to be more relevant in some frames of
reference than others. In particular, one may consider such notions more relevant, or
perhaps more natural, if referred to the rest-frame of the laboratory. In this case, the
model would still provide a possible non-conspiratorial common cause explanation of the
EPR correlations (in the rest-frame of the laboratory). This view has however an obvious
commitment (perhaps undesired by some) to the idea of the existence of a privileged frame
of reference.
As an alternative one could argue that frame dependence may not be as problematic
for our purposes, after all. This, for two reasons, at least. On the one hand, note that
the frame-dependence objection, as stated above, only shows that there is no common
cause account of the EPR phenomena which violates measurement independence and is not
conspiratorial in all frames of reference at once. What the objection does not challenge,
though, is the idea of the existence of a (non-conspiratorial) common cause explanation of
the EPR correlations in any particular frame of reference. Put it differently, we can still
claim that, for any given (fixed) frame of reference, the model still provides a common
cause account of the EPR correlations, which violates measurement independence and yet
is not conspiratorial. This seems to suggest that the model may be able to account for
the EPR correlations in all frames of reference, though the postulated common cause will
be different for some of them. If this were the case then the problematic implications of
the frame dependence of temporal terms could just be taken as an apparent feature of our
(many) possible causal descriptions.
This can only turn out to be a good solution though if one assumes that the common
cause completability theorems are capable of producing screening-off events with the right
space-time features specific to each frame of reference. In particular, we need to make sure,
for each frame of reference, that the screening-off events we postulate as common causes
fall in the right temporal sequence with respect of the corresponding correlated events and
measurement operations. However, common cause completability by itself cannot ensure
that this indeed is going to be the case. The solution above would require therefore that we
impose some extra restrictions on the postulated screening-off events in order for these to
be regarded as actual (common) causes. What such specific extra conditions will look like
will depend, again, on the particular features of each frame of reference. We should want
to know, for instance, whether their strength may vary in different frames, i.e. whether
the space-time features of certain frames of reference may set such strong space-time re-
strictions on the postulated screening-off events as to definitively rule out common cause
explanations in them. In sum then, although it is not clear whether all frames of reference
can accommodate common cause explanations as suggested above, this option can neither
be completely ruled out.
Finally, we may want to stress the fact that what the model really aims at, is a causal
explanation of the correlations. As such, the key point to address here is what we under-
stand by causal explanation. In other words, the specific concept of causation one endorses
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will be crucial. Taking this into account, we shall then point out that there are several
understandings of causation which do not incorporate —nor they need to— any reference
to space-time features of the events involved. A causal account based on pure, so to speak,
type events for instance, with no reference or reduction to token events —which by the way
would be completely compatible with the formulation of RPCC assumed here—, would do.
Counterfactual accounts of causation constitute another way to understand causal relations
without referring to a space-time structure.16 The frame-dependence objection then looses
much of its grip once such views are endorsed.
6 Measurement dependence and locality
As a direct consequence of the violation of measurement independence the model does not
face the charge of Bell’s theorem. This is so simply because measurement independence is
necessary for the derivation of the Bell inequalities. This is certainly good, for it means
that the model allows for the violation of the Bell inequalities and is therefore perfectly
compatible with the (empirically confirmed) quantum mechanical predictions for the EPR
correlations. However, the fact that the model’s common causes are explicitly measurement
dependent seems to have implications as regards locality issues.
The first thing to note in this respect is that it is not the fact that the postulated
common causes are measurement dependent in itself that opens the door to non-locality.
The crucial issue, together with the violation of measurement independence, is the specific
temporal order assumed. More specifically, it is the actual requirement that measurement
dependent common causes do not take place prior to measurement that seems to lead to
conflicts with locality. This becomes clear if we take a look at models featuring backwards in
time causal influences, where the idea of locality is retained even if measurement operations
and common causes (located in their remote past) fail to be statistically independent.
The possibility of backwards in time influences is not, by any means, new. It was ex-
plored for instance in a common cause model proposed by Price (1994, 1996a).17 Price’s
model assumes that the common cause events take place in the overlap of the backward
light-cones of the correlated EPR outcomes. This guarantees that they act locally to pro-
duce the corresponding outcomes. The common causes in the model, however, are causally
influenced (backwards in time) by the measuring operations in both wings. Thus the model
explicitly violates measurement independence. In sum, in Price’s model backwards in time
16I should note that the model is flexible enough not to commit to any particular account of causation
even if, I have to admit, some idea of temporal order needs to be implemented if one is to challenge the
requirement of measurement independence.
17As Sua´rez (2007) points out, although the model was initially presented as a common cause model
(containing backwards in time causal influences), Price seemed later to retract from interpreting it as
causal. In particular, Price (1996b) seems to suggest that the backwards in time influences of the model be
of no causal origin. Sua´rez (2007) also provides an explicit causal interpretation of Price’s model, which I
endorse here.
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influences are what make it possible for the postulated (measurement dependent) common
causes to operate locally.18
As a matter of fact then, when faced with violations of measurement independence, we
seem bound to choose between two type of models, depending on which time ordering is
assumed for the events. A first possibility would be to assume the postulated common
causes to be located in the remote (enough) past of the corresponding outcomes. In this
case they will operate locally to produce these outcomes, but will also need to involve
some backwards in time causal influences (from the experimenter’s measurement choices
or operations on the common causes). I do not see backwards causation as particularly
appealing (mainly for intuitive reasons), though. As an alternative, we may want to locate
the postulated common causes in the future of the measuring operations, as suggested
above. No backwards in time influences are needed in this case but it remains open whether
such a picture involves some sort of non-locality. The question, more specifically, is whether
locality can be retained in a model which violates measurement independence but has no
backwards in time causal influences. My own personal intuitions point to a negative answer
to this question but it seems worthwhile having a closer look to the issue.
As a first reaction, for instance, it seems worth noting that in developing the model we
have only paid attention to the significance and adequacy of measurement independence.
But recall that measurement independence (or the equivalent no-conspiracy) conditions are
just some of the extra restrictions imposed on the idea of Reichenbachian common cause,
alongside other further conditions, some of them associated to locality requirements. What
this means is that, by construction, our model is supposed to have retained some notion
of locality within its event structure. In other words, while the model explicitly violates
measurement independence, it may well be the case that it satisfies the specific locality
assumptions we had imposed onto the postulated common causes. It would be interesting to
see, in case this is so, in what sense we could make sense of the model being local (as required
by some specific locality conditions), despite the failure of measurement independence to
hold. Addressing such issues would require formulating the specific locality conditions and
investigating their relation to measurement independence, and deserve a paper on its own.
Our hopes to retain locality —at least in some standard notion— do not seem too
promising, though. For violations of measurement independence might well be related
to violations of parameter independence, which would in turn imply a violation of Bell’s
factorizability (Bell, 1975). It is not completely clear whether this is really so and I shall
leave it as a conjecture at this point:
Conjecture 1 If measurement independence is violated then parameter independence is
also violated.
As I just pointed out, it is not clear whether Conjecture 1 is true or false but one can
find support for the claim it makes in the following informal intuitive argument.
18Note that the probabilistic event structure of Price’s model and my own is exactly the same. Only, the
interpretation of the events is different.
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Note first that a violation of measurement independence entails, as we have seen in the
previous section, that the common cause depends on both measurement settings. That is:
p(Cabij ∧ Li) 6= p(Cabij ) · p(Li), (18)
p(Cabij ∧Rj) 6= p(Cabij ) · p(Rj), (19)
which entails that
p(Cabij ∧ Li ∧Rj) 6= p(Cabij ) · p(Li ∧Rj), (20)
as long as we assume p(Li) and p(Rj) probabilistically independent.
This in turn seems to suggest that the outcomes will also depend on both measurement
settings, since they obviously depend on the common cause, i.e.
p(Lai |Li ∧Rj ∧ Cabij ) 6= p(Lai |Li ∧ Cabij ), (21)
p(Rbj |Li ∧Rj ∧ Cabij ) 6= p(Rbj|Rj ∧ Cabij ). (22)
This expression is nothing more than the violation of parameter independence.
I would like to stress that whether Conjecture 1 turns out to be true or not is not at
all crucial for the claim in the previous sections that the model is not committed to the
charge of Bell’s theorem to follow. For, as I have pointed out, measurement independence
is already necessary for the Bell inequalities to be derived. That is, the Bell inequalities
cannot be derived if measurement independence is violated, regardless of whether or not
parameter independence is violated as well.19
Again, the main thrust and significance of the claim in the conjecture is related, in my
opinion, to its consequences as regards the local/non-local character of the model. In fact,
did Conjecture 1 turn out to be true, it would seem to provide the grounds to claim that the
model is non-local. More specifically, since parameter independence is necessary for Bell’s
factorizability then, by Conjecture 1, a violation of measurement independence would also
entail that factorizability is violated. This is generally taken to be a sign of non-local
behaviour.20 Furthermore, and also in support of the idea that the model might turn out
to be non-local after all, were Conjecture 1 be confirmed, one could attempt to draw some
parallelisms between the model and Bohm’s quantum mechanics (Bohm, 1952), which is
19Of course, if the my conjecture turns out to be true, parameter independence would be violated in all
cases where measurement independence would fail to hold. In other words, we could not have a model
satisfying parameter independence while measurement independence was violated in it. But, on the other
hand, because of the logical structure of the conjecture we could have models satisfying measurement
independence, where parameter independence was nevertheless violated. This is the case in Bohm’s quantum
mechanics, for instance.
20This diagnosis is not free of controversies, however. Several authors in fact cast doubts as to whether
factorizability indeed reflects the idea of physical locality —especially if locality is merely associated with
the requirement that there not be superluminal signalling between the two wings of the EPR experiment.
See for instance, Wessels (1985); Fine (1986) or Maudlin (1994).
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explicitly non-local. For both of them would be seen to violate parameter independence,
while conforming to outcome independence.
However, the possible resemblances between the model here and Bohm’s quantum me-
chanics are limited and refer, I would say, exclusively to the very fact that in both cases
parameter independence fails and outcome independence is satisfied. There is no resem-
blance at all, for instance, as to how is parameter independence violated in each case. Put
it another way, while it is true that both the model here and Bohm’s theory violate pa-
rameter independence, it is not less true that they do it for different reasons. As we have
seen, the model’s violation of parameter independence comes from a failure of measurement
independence (always assuming that Conjecture 1 is true, of course). But this is not so in
Bohm’s theory, which indeed satisfies measurement independence.21 This means, in terms
of locality/non-locality, that the non-local character that the model displays has a different
source —it may even be fundamentally different in itself— than that in Bohm’s quantum
mechanics. In particular, when it comes to locality issues, the model tells us something
about EPR that Bohmian mechanics does not, namely that measurement operations are
causally relevant to the outcomes in a specific way —they are constitutive of the common
causes. Thus what the model provides, as compared with Bohmian mechanics, is a different
approach to causality and locality.
One may argue however that also Bohm’s theory is capable of a causal explanation of
EPR (even a better one perhaps than that provided here). So why should we go for our
common cause model instead?
We should note first, and before addressing this possible objection, that the aim and
purpose of the model here are not comparable in many senses to that of Bohmian mechan-
ics. In particular, the model has been suggested with the only aim to provide a causal
explanation of the EPR phenomena and, of course, it does not provide —nor it was the
underlying motivation at all— the precise elements for a detailed quantum mechanical de-
scription of EPR as such.22 Thus, the question above should not be taken as a question
about whether one should take stands either for the model I have proposed here or for
Bohmian mechanics. In my opinion, each option should be judged by its own merits.
Having said that, one of the reasons the model may be of use and interest can be
found precisely in our discussion on non-locality above. As I said, the model seems to
convey a different notion of non-locality than that present in Bohmian mechanics. This,
it seems to me, is already interesting in itself, in that it provides an approach to the
issue of locality/non-locality from a different perspective. Furthermore, the causal account
21Recall that because of its logic asymmetry, Conjecture 1 can accommodate violations of parameter
independence in cases measurement independence holds.
22Not even at the ontological level can they be compared, I think. For while Bohm’s quantum mechanics
provides a definite ontological picture for quantum mechanics, the ontology associated to the common
causes in the model is not to be taken as the quantum ontology —again, it is key to bear in mind that
the common causes are not to be seen as hidden variables as such. This is not to say, of course, that the
possible ontologies we might want to provide the model with will not ‘inherit’ somehow, or reflect, some
quantum features, such as non-locality.
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provided by the model is also different in character. As we have seen, the causal explanation
provided by the model has its origins in the very phenomenology of the EPR experiment.
Let me stress again that the common cause model here does not constitute in any sense an
attempt to complete the quantum formalism —again, the fact that common cause are not
to be understood as the usual hidden variables, reinforces this point— but just to provide
a causal explanation of the EPR phenomena. And the assumptions the model builds on
mainly draw from the classical intuitions about the notion of causation, as reflected in
Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. In that sense thus, the common cause
model here is not comparable at all with Bohm’s quantum theory.
What the model really constitutes then is a testing ground for some of our most rooted
intuitions about notions such as causality and locality in the context of quantum mechanics.
For instance, and going back to the issue of the specific locality conditions that the model
may well be thought to satisfy, we saw that there might be some reasons to consider the
model’s common causes as local, even if measurement independence is not satisfied. The
question seems to be then, whether the notion of locality which one can find associated
to measurement independence conditions differs in any fundamental sense from the more
specific notions of locality used in the derivation of the Bell inequalities. The answers to
questions such as that require a close evaluation of the different notions of physical locality
available, including that which is arguably present in Bell’s factorizability condition, as
well as a revision of our most immediate intuitions about the nature of causation.
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